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Summary 
 
An increase in large-scale agricultural investment in land has been going on since the 
global food crisis in 2008. Import-dependent countries have acquired large plots of land 
to secure food supplies. The investments had disastrous impacts on the local communities 
living on the land before the investment took place. Many have been expropriated and 
evicted from their lands, affecting their human rights to property, livelihood, access to 
food and many other interrelated rights. Meanwhile, it remains hard to hold companies 
accountable for their business conduct, although soft law in the form of the Guiding 
Principles has imposed a duty to respect human rights on business enterprises. Analyses 
of the State-investor contracts that regulate the investments show that many of these 
contracts do not take into account the risks for human rights. In reaction to these deficient 
contracts, policy initiatives in the form of guides for negotiators have been developed 
because the contract can influence the impacts on human rights. They recommend, in fact, 
to integrate soft law mechanisms into the contracts.  
This thesis investigates the extent to which the combination of soft law and contract can 
provide better protection for the human rights risks that come with large agricultural 
investments. It identifies the role of the contract on the investment project and explores 
the value of soft law in the particular context of State-investor contracts. Focus is limited 
to sub-Saharan Africa.  
The findings of this thesis indicate that the role of the contract is significant for human 
rights protection, especially when domestic law is weak. Soft law on human rights 
provides useful guidance on how the adverse impacts for human rights can be prevented 
and mitigated. Its value increases in the specific context of contracts, because the effect of 
integrating soft law in the contract means that the commitment to comply with soft law 
becomes a binding obligation on the parties, in fact, a ‘contractualization’ of human rights. 
The integration of soft law in the contract pushes forward respect for human rights, in the 
spirit of the Guiding Principles. However, a shortcoming lays in the fact that the contract 
does still need to be performed. This remains a challenge in practice, partly due to capacity 
constraints to effectively monitor and enforce compliance by the State, but also due to 
conflicts of interest. The contractualization of human rights can thus contribute to better 
protection to the extent to which it is adequately performed and enforced in practice.  
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1. Introduction   
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The run on land  
Since the food crisis of 2008 there has been a large increase on the run for agricultural 
land.1 Global food prices rose dramatically, which caused political and economic 
instability in both developed and poor countries.2 The crisis made many import-
dependent countries aware of their vulnerability to food insecurity. As some governments 
were concerned about the stability of food supplies, they saw the acquisition of farmland 
as a good alternative to purchasing food from international markets.3 This caused their 
augmenting interest in land acquisitions in developing countries.4  
It is hard to tell how much land has been acquired over the past years. Several databases 
collect and present an overview of the intended, concluded and failed land acquisitions. 
The Land Matrix initiated by the International Land Coalition is one of these. Although 
they update numbers daily, it remains hard to give an accurate number because of the 
ongoing basis of the land deals and the fact that land deals are un-transparent. Their 
numbers are therefore most likely an underestimation.5 To give an impression of the 
amount of land that is transferred, in august 2017, the Land Matrix had information about 
1345 deals that cover a number of over 49 million hectares worldwide.6 A significant 
amount of this land is used for food and agriculture.7 Africa is the region with the highest 
land area size under contract.8   
There is a large variety of land acquirers. There are private agri-business deals by 
companies and investment funds9 but deals are also signed directly between two 
                                                          
1 <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-financial-security>, 
retrieved 31-07-2017.  
2 ‘Land Tenure Rights: The Need for Greater Transparency Among Companies Worldwide’, GRI 2016, p.4-5.  
3 Cotula, Lorenzo et al., Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international 
land deals in Africa, IIED/FAO/IFAD, London/Rome, 2009, p. 15.  
4 K. Deiniger & D. Byerlee, ‘Rising Global Interest in Farmland – Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable 
Benefits?’, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2011, p. 25.  
5 <http://landmatrix.org/en/about/#where-does-the-information-come-from>, retrieved 9-8-2017.  
6 <http://landmatrix.org/en/>, retrieved 9-8-2017.  
7 <http://landmatrix.org/en/get-the-idea/agricultural-drivers/>, retrieved 9-8-2017.  
8 C. Althoff et al., “Land grabs” operationalized?, presentation to the Annual World Bank Conference on 
Land and Poverty, Washnigton DC, 14-18 March 2016. 
9 Cotula 2009, p. 37-38. 
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governments, as well as through state-owned enterprises.10 Investors come from all over 
the world, but most frequent from Western countries, the Gulf states and Asia.11  
1.1.2 Investment: a key to development?  
Research conducted by the UNCTAD and the World Bank shows that large-scale 
agricultural investments could bring significant benefits to a host-country and its 
people.12 In many cases, it could lead to GDP growth and bring government revenues due 
to rental fees and income tax at macro-level. In most cases, the investor also brings 
technology, know-how and market access and it could bring economic development to 
rural areas.13 The top five positive outcomes of agricultural investment identified by the 
UNCTAD and World Bank are employment creation, integration of local farmers, 
expansion of market opportunities, the establishment of community development 
programs and increased incomes that improve food security.14 As these benefits are 
catching, many African countries try to attract investors to their country, as it is often seen 
as a key to development. 
On the other hand, agricultural investments are also associated with human rights abuses. 
The loss of land and poor resettlement plans have been mentioned as the standout 
negative impact on farmland investments. It relates to the most common source of conflict 
between the investor who has been granted formal rights to the land by the State, and the 
local people who had been living on the land for many years, but who did not have rights 
that were formally registered.15 Land tenure and access to land are extremely important, 
as it is the key on which ultimately all livelihoods and human wealth, well-being and 
culture are dependent, as well as their access to food, water, and other natural 
resources.16 When people get evicted from their lands, or when they are subject to 
inadequate resettlement plans, this often leads to an abuse of their right to property, 
livelihood, food and many interrelated rights. An investment which has this effect often 
results in increased poverty instead of bringing development. These are the kind of deals 
                                                          
10 Cotula 2009, p. 35-36.  
11 <http://landmatrix.org/en/get-the-idea/web-transnational-deals/>, retrieved 9-8-2017.  
12 C. Smaller & W. Speller, with H. Mirza, N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, and G. Dixie, ‘Investment Contracts 
for Agriculture: Maximizing Gains and Minimizing Risks’, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group; New York: 
United Nations; and Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2015, p. 7.  
13 Cotula 2009, p. 15.  
14 Smaller & Speller 2015.  
15 Smaller & Speller 2015, p. 15.   
16 Vhugen, Darryl, ‘Large-Scale Commercial Investment In Land: Seeking to Secure Land Tenure and 
Improve Livelihoods’, Haramaya Law Review 2012, Vol. 1 No.1, p. 13.  
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that have been called ‘land grabs’.17 In these situations, even a deal that may be 
economically beneficial to the country as a whole, may have disastrous impacts on human 
rights when they are not adequately taken into account.18 
According to the world bank, the top 5 adverse impacts of large-scale agricultural 
investments relate to the loss of land, lack of openness and engagement with local 
communities, weak assessment of commercial viability, poor management of 
environmental and social impacts and insufficient mechanisms to raise grievances.19  
1.1.3 The gap in legal protections accompanying large-scale agricultural investments 
The question rises whether companies cannot just be held accountable for their 
infringements on human rights, or whether they can be forced to take into account human 
rights when investing. The protection of human rights during these large-scale 
agricultural investments is in many cases weak. In the first place because the domestic 
law may not be fully developed for what regards human rights protection, and when it is 
in place, developing country governments may not always have the capacity to enforce 
these laws effectively.20 Conflicts of interest also occur, where the government prioritizes 
the attraction of investment projects even though these may be detrimental to the human 
rights of local people. Furthermore, neither the law of the home country of the investor 
where it is incorporated can offer protection if it could, because it does usually not reach 
extraterritorially. In addition, protection of human rights has been regulated by several 
human rights treaties,21 but companies can neither be held accountable under 
                                                          
17 The definition of a land grab is defined by the ILC as land acquisitions or concessions that may be 
subject to one or more of the following criteria: i) In violation of human rights, particularly the equal 
rights of women; ii) Not based on the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of the affected land-users; 
iii) Not based on a thorough assessment or in disregard of social, economic, and environmental impacts, 
including the way these impacts are gendered; iv) Not based on transparent contracts that specify clear 
and binding commitments about activities, employment, and benefits-sharing; and/or v) Not based on 
effective democratic planning, independent oversight, and meaningful participation. Source: ‘Tirana 
Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor in Times of Intensified Natural Resources Competition’, 
International Land Coalition 2011. Available at: 
<http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/tiranadeclaration.pdf>, 
retrieved 13-8-2017.  
18 Cotula 2011, p. 30.   
19 Smaller & Speller 2015, p. 25.  
20 C. Smaller, ‘The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland and Water’, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2014, p. 5.   
21 The UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR are relevant human rights treaties. 
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international law, as these duties to protect human rights contain only binding obligations 
on States.22  
To try to fill this gap of corporate accountability in the law, the Guiding Principles (GPs) 
were published in 2011, by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
(SRSG), John Ruggie.23 The GPs impose on business enterprises a duty to respect human 
rights when they conduct business. “They should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others, and they should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved.”24 The GPs also propose how this respect can be achieved. This duty is the basic 
expectation that society has of business in relation to human rights.25 However, the GPs 
are soft law. This is partly because a binding document was not yet a realistic option 
because the different stakeholders find it extremely hard to agree on a binding document 
on business and human rights.26 
Another soft law initiative that contributes to human rights protection is the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which contains recommendations on 
responsible business conduct.27 The governments that adhere to the guidelines are 
required to set up a National Contact Point (NCP), which contains a grievance mechanism 
to resolve cases through mediation or conciliation between a complainant and a company, 
usually about alleged non-observance of the Guidelines.28 However, as the NCP is not a 
court, they cannot impose penalties on companies, and they don’t have any powers of 
enforceability.29 Nevertheless, they can publish a report on their website which has a 
naming and shaming function that can cause reputational damage to the company.30   
                                                          
22 <http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/>, 
retrieved 14-8-2017.  
23 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31, 2011. John Ruggie is a professor of human rights and 
international affairs at Harvard University, who had previous experience at the UN. 
24 Guiding Principles A/HRC/17/31, Principle 11, p. 13.  
25 United Nations Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, 2008, p. 5.  
26 J. Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?’, 28 January 2014. 
27 OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, OECD Publishing 2011.  
28 ‘Frequently Asked Questions – National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’, OECD 2017, p. 1.  
29 S. Marshall, ‘OECD National Contact Points: Better Navigating Conflict to Provide Remedy for Vulnerable 
Communities’, Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms Report Series 16, 2016, p. 6.  
30 ‘Frequently Asked Questions – National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises’, p. 2.  
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Stronger protection for human rights only exists when the investor has asked for loans, 
guarantees or assistance of the International Finance Corporation.31 The IFC has made a 
strategic commitment to sustainable development, for which they have developed 8 
Performance Standards that are directed towards clients, who are required to apply these 
standards to manage the environmental and social risks and impacts to enhance 
development opportunities.32 The performance of the protections laid down in the 
standards is then supervised by the IFC and the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO).33 
The same goes for clients that receive loans from banks that have signed up to the Equator 
Principles, which are based on the IFC Performance Standards and which the clients will 
have to comply with.34 
1.1.4 State-investor contracts  
State-investor contracts are the agreements concluded between an investor and the host-
State, and are an important part of the investment legal framework.35 Analyses of State-
investor contracts currently in force have revealed shocking information. There are 
examples of investment contracts that concern the lease of enormous amounts of land 
that are being transferred by a contract of barely 6 pages.36 The land transfers concluded 
in these contracts could pose severe risks to human rights. In many cases, human rights 
were not taken into account, and no safeguards could be found in the contracts. When 
nothing is regulated about human rights, it is not surprising that adverse impacts on them 
are likely to happen.  
In reaction to the revelation of these deficient contracts, and because of the recognition 
that the human rights impact of business operations could be affected by investment 
                                                          
31 The IFC is an international financial institution that provides services in the form of financial resources, 
technical experience, global experience and innovative thinking to help their clients, private investors in 
developing countries, with financial and operational challenges. Source: 
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/about+ifc_new>, 
retrieved 27-07-2017. 
32 IFC, IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, January 2012. 
33 <http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/whoweare/>, retrieved 11-8-2017. 
34 Equator Principles, The Equator Principles June 2013, p. 2. Available at: <http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf>, retrieved 3-8-2017 
35 Other names for the same type of agreement are also common, such as: ’Host Government Agreements; 
Host Country Agreements; Production Sharing Agreements; Concession Contracts and Licence 
Agreements’. Source: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-rights/connections/regulating-
investment/state-investor-contracts/, retrieved 26-06-2017.  
36 Investment agreement between the Republic of Mali and La Grande Jamahiriya arabe Libyenne 
populaire et socialiste of 2008, available at: <https://www.farmlandgrab.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/Convention.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
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contracts,37 soft law initiatives that try to improve protection for human rights in these 
contracts have been developed in the form of guides for negotiators.38 These focus on 
drafting contracts that will lead to responsible, sustainable investment projects, and make 
recommendations for what to include in the contract to create safeguards for human 
rights. These recommendations often imply the inclusion of a strategy or mechanism39 for 
human rights protection developed in other soft law documents, sometimes even by 
referring directly to these.  
1.2 Purpose and research question 
This thesis tries to investigate the potential effectiveness of combining soft law and 
contract, on which the guides for negotiators, in fact, are based. The central question of 
this thesis sounds therefore:  
1. ‘To what extent can soft law and State-investor contracts combined provide better 
protection for the human rights risks that come with large agricultural 
investments?’  
To answer this question, two sub-questions are relevant:  
a) ‘What can be the role of a State-investor contract for the protection of human 
rights?’  
b) ‘What is the specific value of soft law in the context of State-investor contracts?’ 
The fact that so many human rights are at stake, and that so many people find their rights 
infringed by an investment project, makes that it is worth examining how these risks can 
be prevented and mitigated, and what strategies will be effective to achieve this.  
1.3 Methods and materials 
This research is based on a legal analysis of hard and soft law instruments, and State-
investor contracts. Additionally, a case study has been conducted based on web research 
and publicly available documents.  
                                                          
37 Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-
Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators, Addendum 3 to the Report, 
A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011, p. 4.  
38 Principles for Responsible Contracts A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011 and Smaller 2014.  
39 ‘Mechanism’ in this thesis refers to the concrete strategies and policies that soft law has developed to 
prevent and mitigate adverse impacts on human right. Examples are a due diligence or a grievance 
mechanism. 
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1.4 Delimitations 
First, although land grabs and the connected human rights abuses occur not only in 
relation to agricultural investments and may happen worldwide, this research will be 
limited to the adverse impacts in the agri-business sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, 
more specific focus will lay with the top 5 adverse impacts of agricultural investments 
identified by the World Bank, and with the human rights abuses that follow with these 
adverse impacts. Third, despite the fact that most relevant instruments and initiatives also 
cover positive impacts of such investments and aim for improving sustainable 
development in general, which means that they try to maximize the gains while 
minimizing the risks, focus in this thesis will be on mitigating the adverse impacts on 
human rights. Finally, the thesis will be limited to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).40 
1.5 Outline 
In order to answer the central question, chapter 2 will be concerned with the first sub-
question, that tries to analyze the role of a contract for the protection of human rights. For 
this purpose, the legal framework of investment and a contract analysis will be conducted. 
Chapter 3 will discuss how a combination of contract and soft law is made in current 
policy initiatives in the form of guides for negotiators. It will analyze what specific 
mechanisms are proposed and how soft law can contribute to better protection of human 
rights. This relates to the second sub-question that tries to identify the value of soft law in 
the context of State-investor contracts. Chapter 4 will subsequently consider the effects 
of combining soft law and contract and will discuss challenges and opportunities. Chapter 
5 contains a case study, where the available contract and the references that it makes to 
soft law will be compared with what has been found ‘on the ground’. This will show what 
consequences the integration of soft law in a contract has in practice, and where 
shortcomings lay. Finally, the central question will be answered to what extent this 
combination is (potentially) successful in achieving better protection for human rights. 
 
                                                          
40 FDI has been classified by the IMF as “a category of international investment that reflects the objective 
of a resident in one economy (the director investor) obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident 
in another economy (the direct investment enterprise). Source: International Monetary Fund, ‘Foreign 
Direct Investment Trends and Statistics’, IMF 2003, p. 6. Available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fdi/eng/2003/102803.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
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2. Analysis of State-investor contracts 
This chapter will identify the role of the contract. First, its position within the legal 
framework will be studied. Subsequently, a contract analysis will be conducted to see 
what kind of clauses current State-investor contracts contain.  
2.1 The role of the contract within the legal framework of investment 
As many agricultural investments result in land grabs, it is interesting to know what legal 
framework is applicable to these investments. These may all influence the outcome of the 
project. The desired hierarchy of sources of law that apply to an investment project is 
respectively domestic law, followed by State-investor contracts and at last International 
Investment Treaties.41 The following part will explain why this hierarchy is relevant. 
2.1.1 Domestic law 
Domestic law is considered as the most important source of law for investment. If fully 
developed, it should be able to achieve the positive benefits of foreign investment while 
functioning at the same time as a buttress against the negative impacts.42 Domestic law 
typically regulates the admission of foreign investors, taxation, land laws, requirements 
for community consultation as well as laws that govern the potential impacts of an 
investment on the environment and local communities.43 The issues regulated by 
domestic law do not need to be included in the contract. A well-developed domestic law 
is beneficial for the government, because it will bring stability and equality for what 
applies to investment projects in a country.  
2.1.2 State-investor contracts  
After domestic law, the contract is most relevant. The contract forms the basis of the 
relationship between the parties and shapes what the investment will look like. The 
contract usually contains the most project-specific needs, and will lay down the way risks, 
costs and benefits are distributed at project level.44 When domestic law is well-developed, 
the contract will only have to delineate the issues specific to the project such as the 
duration of the lease, price, and quantity.45  
                                                          
41 Smaller 2014, p. 7.  
42 Smaller 2014, p. 5.   
43 Smaller 2014, p. 5.   
44 Cotula 2011, p. 1.  
45 Smaller 2014, p. 5.  
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The increasing role of the State-investor contract when domestic law falls short  
Although preference is given to domestic law as the primary source of law that governs 
the investment,46 this is often not possible in practice. In reality, in many developing 
countries it is not possible to rely entirely on domestic law, because it may either not be 
in place, or because it is not sufficiently developed and detailed. In case it is in place, it 
may not be implemented or adequately enforced.47   
This increases the role of a State-investor contract. Apart from only dealing with project-
specific issues, it will now also have to include other aspects, such as taxation, export 
rights and many more things that relate to “the key elements of the fiscal and economic 
bargain relating to the investment”.48 In addition, the contract may also have to take up 
clauses that regard to the possible adverse impacts such as the impact on the environment 
and human rights. This makes the contract a critical document for what regards the 
possible outcome of the project and increases the relevance of a well-drafted State-
investor contract. 
In many cases, the contract will thus fill the governance gap created by shortcomings of 
domestic law in the host country. This could both have advantages and disadvantages. In 
a good situation, the contract could apply higher international standards on the 
investment project, provide guidance on what assessments could contain and it could 
point to best practice as the reference point.49 On the other hand, the contract could 
undermine or displace domestic law, or even frustrate it through the use of stabilization 
clauses. These clauses may be included as a protection for the investor to be exempted 
from any new law imposed by the government, and that may be to their disadvantage.50 
This is an important reason why preference is given to domestic law. 
2.1.3 International Investment Treaties 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) are signed by States to protect and promote 
foreign investment and should be of least influence on investment projects. Protection 
and stability are desirable because investing in another country is not without risks. The 
investors put themselves under the rule of a foreign government, but this regime could 
                                                          
46 Smaller 2014, p.5.  
47 Smaller & Speller 2015, p. 3.   
48 Smaller 2014, p. 5 
49 Smaller & Speller 2015, p. 3.  
50 Smaller 2014, p. 5.  
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potentially treat them unfavorably.51 A widespread fear relates to expropriation of the 
investor by the host-country. For this reason, the capital-exporting countries have since 
the beginning of foreign investment created IIAs with the purpose to address the risks of 
a long-term investment.52 Rules for the treatment of aliens have been central. 
The most common type of IIAs are Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which are 
concluded between two states. The advantage of a BIT is usually the promotion of 
economic cooperation and capital flows, and on the other hand protection for the foreign 
investor in the host State.53 Besides, it often provides for dispute settlement through 
investor-state arbitration, either before a Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) tribunal54 or through another kind of arbitration.55 Capital-importing 
countries (host states) usually sign these BITs because they want to attract investment 
and create an investment-friendly climate.56  
2.2 Contract analysis   
Because State-investor contracts will in many cases play a significant role in regulating 
the investment, it is interesting to analyze what these contracts exactly look like and what 
is included in them.  
2.2.1 Lack of transparency  
Analyzing State-investor contracts is however not an obvious thing to do. In most cases, 
the State-investor contracts are kept secret and negotiation processes usually take place 
behind closed doors. What exactly can be found in contracts is therefore relatively 
unknown.57 The reason why contracts are usually kept secret is because, on the side of 
the investor, there is a fear to give away commercially sensitive information to 
competitors. Meanwhile, the host State may be afraid of a ‘race to the bottom’.58 This 
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implies that a commercial advantage given to one competitor could also be asked for by 
the next investor, but that they might not want to offer this time. This could affect their 
bargaining power negatively.59 Nevertheless, reports from the past decade has provided 
us with a bit more insight in these contracts.  
2.2.2 Introduction and side notes  
The following part will analyse a number of State-investor contracts that are still in force 
today, and will scrutinize where risks for human rights and opportunities for protection 
can be identified. This will provide us with an overview of the current situation around 
State-investor contracts. The analysis is mostly based on a report that analyzed 12 
modern contracts for agricultural investments in sub-Saharan Africa and the associated 
remarks by the researcher.60 When discussing stabilization clauses, the observations also 
rely on a research conducted by the IFC and the Special Representative.61 Where available, 
the discussed contracts can be found back in footnotes. However, not all of them were 
available or findable. 
Some short side notes need to be made beforehand. It needs to be realized that land deals 
may come in many different shapes. There can be just one contract, but a deal can 
additionally constitute of several project documents and legal instruments, which might 
not always have been available to the researcher. The second note is that the contract 
always needs to be read in the light of the bigger legal framework under which the 
investment is made, such as international laws and the domestic law to the particular 
country where the investment is made. The clauses can therefore not be judged in 
isolation.62 This makes that the analyses made by the researchers may inevitably be 
preliminary and incomplete. These differences in legal options for regulating the 
investment also makes the contracts neither always comparable, for example as some 
contracts also relate to renegotiations, which may therefore look different and perhaps 
less comprehensive. However, research on State-investor contract is still relevant since 
the aim is to promote debate on the issues that are presented and learn from practice.63 
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2.2.3 Contract analysis  
Overall contract outlook 
When it comes to the overall outlook of the contracts analysed in this research, it is 
striking that contracts for certain deals that involve the allocation of large areas of land 
are extremely short, (6 pages for 100.000 hectares).64 This deal is likely to have major 
economic, social and environmental impacts, although “the lack of specificity may 
arguably undermine safeguards to ensure that risks will be properly managed and that 
expected benefits will materialize”, which is worrisome.65 Even though this does not imply 
that a longer contract will, without doubt, take better care of certain risks and other 
important aspects, a short contract does in most cases simply not leave space to regulate 
all possible risks to human rights. 
Transfer of local land rights  
An important issue in the contract relates to what safeguards are in place when land is 
transferred, to which local people had land rights. As described in the introduction, other 
fundamental human rights might also get affected when the land on which they lived or 
relied is being transferred. These relate to the human right to property, the right to food, 
housing and the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands.66 To mitigate 
these adverse impacts, safeguards should be included in the contract.  
In most African countries, all land is owned by the state. Nevertheless, in many areas 
customary land tenure systems are in place and perceived as legitimate by the people who 
rely on the presumption that the land is ‘theirs’.67 In this regard, it is important to note 
that the human right to property has consistently been interpreted as to include also 
collective and customary rights, even where these have no legal recognition under 
national law.68 
However, despite this right, the local people often remain in a vulnerable position because 
they do not have certificates that prove their ownership of the land.69 In addition to this, 
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almost all countries have legislation that enables the government to take their rights 
compulsorily if this is in the public interest, usually under a requirement to pay 
compensation. Moreover, in Africa, many private investments that involve the acquisition 
of land have also been legislatively deemed to be of public interest, so that land rights 
were taken.70 Property rights are thus often weak and easily set aside. The effect of this is 
that local people were often worse off, even in situations where the investment had been 
considered to be beneficial to the country as a whole.71  
Good practice in this regard consists of clauses which regulate that the investor will pay 
annual rent not only to the government, but also to the local community (Sudan), or where 
local landholders are given a share in the produce of the land (Madagascar), or where a 
community development fund was established (Liberia).72 Other safeguards for human 
rights consist of principles that come from soft law, such as resettlement action plans 
contained in the IFC Performance Standards. In many cases, such safeguards are included 
when international lenders are involved and who require that the project must comply 
with these criteria.  
Moreover, an outstanding factor in the contracts that affects the people and their land 
rights is the often long duration of the investment contracts. Common practice seems to 
be a duration for about a century, often in the form of a renewable 50-year term.73 This 
will inevitably have a significant impact on the people that live on the lands that will be 
leased, as they might be separated from it for generations.74 Another outstanding matter 
is the fact that some contracts don’t include specific GPS locations for the land that will be 
leased, beyond some broad geographical references. This is not beneficial to both the host 
country and a possibly affected community, as the investor can in that situation ‘pick and 
choose’ the land it wants to operate on.75  
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Safeguards for local people and the environment 
What should be aspired to achieve, is that the contract will take into account risks for 
human rights and the environment. These risks are often identified through an 
environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA), that aims to identify and mitigate the 
risks of a project prior to a land transfer deal. Some of the analyzed contracts made 
reference to such an ESIA. Other contracts required ‘feasibility studies’ based on national 
law, without explicit mentioning of an ESIA. The problem is, however, that national law 
might lack exact criteria for approving of failing land deal applications. In addition, they 
may often neither be available for public scrutiny.76 
Best practice in this field refers to contracts that refer to international soft law 
instruments, such as the Equator Principles which include impact assessment 
requirements.77 The only uncertainty is the extent to which the host state will in certain 
cases be able to ensure enforcement of these standards.78  
Food security 
In many contracts no mention was made of food security, or safeguards for food security. 
This contrasts with the policy objectives to improve food security on which some 
countries justify the settling of investors.79 Good practice would relate to clauses that 
granted the investor the right to export “provided domestic consumption demands are 
met”.80  
Host country benefits 
The first common benefit of the lease of land often constitutes rental fees, paid to the 
government, although these may be quite low. Exemption for the first couple of years of 
the investment happens as well,81 as might the fees sometimes be periodically adjusted 
(for example in the light of inflation).82 Some of the contracts analysed did not mention 
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any payment of land fees, which suggests that the investor would get the land for free. 
However, instead of rental fees, the host country might also be compensated in the form 
of other investor commitments to contribute capital and develop infrastructure in the 
host country. This can be beneficial to a country when the government has not enough 
resources to do this themselves.  
There are two major problems related to this. The first thing is that land might be 
transferred below market price. The other problem is that compensation in the form of 
investment contributions needs to have clear clauses in the contract where the investor’s 
commitments are precisely described. The same goes for the host state capacity to 
monitor compliance of these commitments and to sanction non-compliance. It seems 
important that the investor needs to make clear when, where and of what quality these 
contributions will be.83 The same goes for commitments on employment creation. The 
expected benefits may be hard to enforce if no clear numbers of jobs or required skills are 
included in the contract, while employment creation can in principle be a valuable benefit 
of an investment project.84  
Stabilization clauses 
When signing a contract with the State, the investor faces political risks that can be 
described as ”the State’s use of regulatory authority after the negotiation of the contract 
to change the conditions applicable to the contract.”85 While it is understandable that the 
investor wants to protect himself against arbitrary action that may adversely affect the 
investment project, or even against expropriation, stabilization clauses are considered as 
controversial, and usually not in the interest of human rights. 
Research published by the IFC together with the Special Representative in 2009, shows 
that stabilization clauses have been found in many contracts.86 They appear in different 
forms: freezing clauses, which ‘freeze’ the law of the host state for the duration of the 
investment project, economic equilibrium clauses, which require the investor to comply 
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with new laws but to be compensated for the costs of compliance, and hybrid clauses, 
which combine aspects of the two mentioned above.87 
Research on stabilization clauses has pointed out that these clauses can stand in the way 
to improve the situation for human rights, as these clauses can be used to limit the state’s 
ability to implement new social and environmental laws to long-term investments.88 If a 
stabilization clause is included in the contract, these higher standards under national law 
cannot be imposed on the investor as they may, for example, be exempted from “any new 
law”.89 As contracts often run for several decades, the host State’s effort to improve 
safeguards for human rights may not apply to the large-scale investment projects carried 
out in their country, where higher protection standards are beneficial to human rights. 
Stabilization clauses are thus hindering the ability of the State to protect human rights. 
They also hinder the State’s ability to fulfill their duty under international law. This may 
be detrimental to the development of protection of human rights.  
Stabilization clauses have a bigger impact when they are drafted vaguely. Best contractual 
practice is therefore considered to make sure that social and environmental matters are 
not stabilized and to clearly define the scope of the clauses.90   
The negotiation process of contracts   
Irrespective of contract clauses, the process behind it is also important. As most land in 
Africa is owned by the State, contracts are usually concluded with the central government. 
Even though the transfer may be completely legally concluded, local people with 
legitimate land rights may find themselves dispossessed and find their human rights 
infringed.91 In most cases, they do not have a say in the negotiations. A key aspect relates 
therefore to the extent to which local landholders can influence decisions that affect their 
land.92 Good practice would therefore involve the consultation of the local communities.  
2.2.4 Concluding remarks   
Even though domestic law ought to be the most important instrument to regulate 
investment, it is in many cases not possible to rely entirely on it because it may not be 
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fully developed, particularly in regard to human rights. The contract may then become an 
important document where safeguards for human rights could be included.  
Analysis of contracts currently in force show, however, that irrespective of the state of 
domestic law, safeguards for human rights are absent in many cases, and some clauses 
may pose risks to human rights. The expressed concern by one of the researchers that 
“some contracts underpinning the recent wave of land acquisitions may not be fit for 
purpose”93 is therefore understandable. Contracts are considered to be too short and 
unspecific and only include vague promises, while safeguards for local people are weak.94 
These facts justify the need to improve future contracts and to make negotiators aware of 
the role of a contract for human rights protection.   
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3. Soft law in the context of State-investor contracts 
 
This chapter will contain an analysis of policy initiatives to create State-investor contracts 
that are more sustainable, in particular to human rights. It will analyze how soft law and 
contract are combined in these initiatives and how applying soft law would lead to better 
protection of human rights. First, there will be a short elaboration of the corporate duty 
to respect, to understand under what framework these different types of soft laws are 
created.  
3.1 Soft law on human rights protection 
The efforts to prevent and mitigate the adverse impacts on human rights during business 
activities are usually a performance of the corporate duty to respect human rights, 
developed in the Guiding Principles. The second pillar of the GPs state that business 
enterprises should respect human rights, in a way that they do not infringe on the human 
rights of others and that they should address adverse human rights impacts with which 
they are involved.95 This duty exists independently of what the State does to perform its 
obligation to protect human rights. This implies that when a State has not implemented 
international human rights in national law, business enterprises are still required to 
respect internationally recognized human rights, to a minimum those expressed in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the rights in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work.96  
As some companies are more likely to affect particular human rights due to their activities 
in a specific industry or context, they should pay specific attention to these rights, 
according to the GPs.97 In the case of agricultural investments, this means that for example 
rights to livelihood and property of land need special regard. Moreover, the size, sector, 
operational context or ownership of the business enterprise doesn’t matter, as: “the 
responsibility to respect human rights applies fully and equally to all business 
enterprises.”98 
As regards the scope of human rights issues that companies should address, the main goal 
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in respecting human rights is that companies will “a) Avoid causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts 
when they occur; and b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that 
are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business 
relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts.”99  
The GPs also lay down how companies are expected to fulfill the duty to respect. This is 
through adopting a policy commitment, conducting a human rights due-diligence process 
to identify, prevent and mitigate their impacts on human rights, and through enabling for 
remediation of any adverse human rights risk that may still occur, despite these efforts.100 
The principle idea is thus that potential impacts should be addressed through prevention 
and mitigation, while human rights abuses that have already occurred should be subject 
to remediation.101 In addition to the GPs, other soft law has been created to support the 
efficacy of this duty, some of these even with a specific focus on human rights related to 
land transfers. They provide guidance and benchmarks for companies. 
The GPs are a soft law document, because attempts to create a binding document was not 
yet realistic, as the different stakeholders had very different views on the topic of business 
and human rights. However, this did not mean that any international legal development 
was completely out of reach.102 Indeed, soft law can make an important contribution as a 
first step. The GPs now constitute an authoritative framework for which there is much 
respect in global society. Beyond the Human Rights Council, they have been endorsed by 
Governments, business enterprises, and associations, by civil society, national human 
rights institutions and investors.103  
A question that may remain is the extent to which business enterprises will voluntarily 
comply with the GPs, as it concerns a soft law document. Nevertheless, many States have 
legislated the duty for companies to respect human rights in their domestic law. As 
companies are bound by this, respecting human rights is not merely voluntary under 
national law. Another example where the GPs have become hard law is through the EU 
Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information, where the GPs are 
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integrated.104 Another way through which companies may be obliged to respect human 
rights is when this duty has been incorporated in contractual clauses between companies 
and their business partners. Furthermore, companies may be subject to what has been 
called the ‘court of public opinion’. When a company does not respect human rights, they 
could suffer reputational damage, which will in many cases also have financial 
consequences.105  
3.1.2 Policy initiatives in the area of soft law and contracts 
The SRSG identified that investment contracts are an important instrument through 
which States and business enterprises could affect the human rights impact of business 
activities and investments.106 After several analyses of State-investor contracts, also other 
stakeholders felt that there was a need to improve the deficient contracts. In reaction to 
this, soft law in the form of guides for negotiators have been created, in order “to help 
integrate the management of human rights risks into investment project contract 
negotiations between host State entities and foreign business investors.”107 These guides 
aim to create responsible, sustainable investment contracts by recommending what 
should be included in such a contract. In fact, for many issues, this comes down to the 
integration of different protection mechanisms created in other soft law, into the 
negotiation process of the contract. This implies that soft law and contracts are combined 
in an attempt to improve protection for human rights. The following part will analyze two 
of these guides for negotiators to see how this is done. 
3.2 Analysis of two guides for negotiators  
The first guide whose recommendations will be discussed are the Principles for 
responsible contracts,108 created by the SRSG in 2011 as an addendum to the GPs. A clear 
reliance on them can therefore be remarked. The document contains ten main principles. 
In general, one could say that the guide reflects the general responsibilities of the State 
and the investor to protect and respect human rights and makes recommendations of how 
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this can be achieved when drafting an investment contract. Next, it recommends to 
include some of its well-developed mechanisms that contribute to ensuring respect for 
human rights, such as a due diligence and a grievance mechanism. 
The second document that will be discussed is The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment 
Contracts for Farmland and Water.109 This document has a focus on long-term leases of 
farmland and was inspired to a large extent by the Model Mine Development 
Agreement110 and 80 other agricultural contracts that were analyzed. The document 
includes amongst others a checklist of common issues that may arise, and that the parties 
can consider to include in their contracts.111 Besides, it makes explicit references to 
agriculture-specific soft law. It is therefore a good example of how this guide tries to 
encourage negotiators to include soft law mechanisms in their contracts.  
The analysis will focus on what specific soft law mechanisms are recommended to include 
in the contracting process, and will identify how human rights protection would be 
achieved. Besides, it will also analyze what general recommendations for contract 
drafting are made in these guides, as they contain essential recommendation to create 
sustainable contracts.  
3.2.1 The different stages of the contracting process 
Both guides distinguish different stages of the contracting process, for which they try to 
create awareness. They identify a pre-negotiation stage, before the real contract 
negotiation stage. Subsequently, the project has to be implemented, after which a 
monitoring and enforcement stage begins. The figure on the next page graphically 
illustrates what the contracting process will look like according to the SRSG. When 
potential risks are identified at an early stage, this can assist the parties in establishing 
clear roles and responsibilities for the prevention and mitigation of the impact, and it can 
help them to facilitate cooperation and effective management throughout the life-cycle of 
the project. These efforts will then contribute to increasing the positive outcomes of the 
benefits, also for human rights.112    
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113 
3.2.2 Pre-negotiation stage - general recommendations  
The pre-negotiation stage is considered as an essential phase. The following part will 
discuss some general recommendations that the guides make and that are necessary to 
create better contracts. 
Adequate preparation of the parties 
It is recommended that the parties prepare themselves adequately before they enter 
negotiations. Preparation means that they identify the possible benefits and risks for 
human rights of the investment, and assess if they have the capacity to properly address 
the human rights implications of the project.114 This is necessary because only then the 
parties will know what issues need to be negotiated and where safeguards need to be 
included. At this stage, access to information and expertise is essential to make informed 
decisions on different aspects of the deal, such as economic, legal, technical, as well as 
human rights issues. For states, this might be available through international 
development cooperation.115 In general, the State and the investor should have a clear 
idea of how the project objectives, opportunities, and risks relate to its responsibility to 
protect or respect human rights.116 They should enter the negotiations both having the 
aim to ensure that the adverse impacts of human rights will be avoided and mitigated.117  
                                                          
113 Principles for Responsible Contracts A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011. p. 7.  
114 Principles for Responsible Contracts A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011. p. 7.  
115 Principles for Responsible Contracts A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011, p. 8-9.  
116 Principles for Responsible Contracts A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011, p. 7.  
117 Principles for Responsible Contracts A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011, p. 8.  
29 
 
Awareness of the role of the contract  
Preparation also includes the identification of the role that the contract will play. Parties 
need to know the content of domestic law. When domestic law is weak and undeveloped, 
like in many developing countries, the investment contract will have to be more 
comprehensive. In many cases, it necessarily also delineates taxation, export rights and 
access to water, next to sustainable development elements such as economic, 
environmental, social and human rights.118  
Negotiation dynamics  
The parties may have different bargaining power. A wealthy investor may have better 
resources, expertise and negotiation skills than a developing-country government. 
However, the IISD guide recommends that focus should be on getting the best possible 
deal for both parties, in fact an interest-based negotiation where all stakeholders find 
their interests reflected without jeopardizing the others. This is considered necessary, as 
a deal that neglects to take into account certain interests may at a later stage threaten the 
viability of the project.119 Besides, the State needs to assess whether they consider the 
investor as a reliable business partner. They can do this by screening the investors’ 
business plan, financial resources, and previous agricultural experience.120 
Priorities for Rural Development and Food Security 
The first issue that the State should identify is how the investment can be linked to its 
national rural or agricultural development strategy. This can help the parties to determine 
the crops, target areas and groups that will be promoted or prioritized. In this way, it can 
be assured beforehand that the investment will contribute to development and food 
security.121  
3.2.3 Pre-negotiation stage and the integration of soft law mechanisms 
The following part will describe which soft law mechanisms are desirably integrated into 
the pre-negotiation stage of the investment, and how this should be done according to the 
guides.  
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Due Diligence     
The Principles for responsible contracts state that the parties need to be aware of the 
actual and potential adverse impacts that could follow with an investment. They should 
get to know this through due diligence, feasibility studies, and other impact 
assessments.122 Due diligence with particular regard  to human rights has been developed 
as a mechanism in the GPs.123 It can best be described as: “the continuous process of 
identifying and addressing the human rights impact of a company across its operations 
and products, and throughout its supplier and business partner networks.”124 Due 
diligence is considered to be an effective way of mitigating human rights risks. Moreover, 
the concept of due diligence is well-known to businesses, as enterprises usually 
continually carry out risk assessment processes to maximize their profits. This experience 
probably helps them to understand its meaning.125 
The human rights due diligence should try to clarify the specific impact that the business 
activity may have on specific people, in a specific context of operations. The individual 
aspects that have to be identified are mainly the human rights context prior to the 
proposed activity, the people that may be affected, the human rights that are at risk and 
how this particular activity could have an adverse impact on these people and their 
human rights.126 To make this assessment, they have to make use of internal and/or 
external human rights expertise. Next, they will also have to rely on meaningful 
consultation with people that might potentially be affected by their operations, as well as 
other stakeholders.127  
Due diligence has to be carried out at the earliest stage of a new project before 
negotiations have even started, but also during the life-cycle of the project, because risks 
may change over time as the operations continue.128 The benefits of doing a human rights 
due diligence at the pre-negotiation stage are that potential risks can be identified and 
that subsequently during contract drafting, the contract can delineate who is responsible 
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for doing periodical impact assessments on human rights, and who bears responsibility 
and accountability for preventing and mitigating the identified risks. For this, a plan for 
the integration of the findings will have to be devised, as well as how these mitigating 
efforts will be financed, for which a financial mechanism fund may have to be set up. 
Besides, the guidance also states that the parties will also have to create a plan for how to 
communicate the identified risks with the people whom it may potentially affect, to 
involve them in the development of the prevention and mitigation strategies.129 Carrying 
out a human rights due diligence before the contract drafting stage is thus necessary to be 
able to divide responsibility for preventing risks in the contract appropriately.  
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments  
Another type of due diligence and identifying risks and impacts beforehand can be done 
through ESIAs (Environmental and Social Impact Assessment). The IISD Guide requires 
that the company shall have an ESIA prepared, in accordance with either domestic law or 
IFC Performance Standard 1. Here another reference to soft law is found. 
The Performance Standards constitute an authoritative piece of soft law and have 
generated much prestige as they are frequently referred to in other soft law documents. 
They could even be found back in contracts where parties were not IFC clients.130 The 
Performance Standards are 8 in total and provide guidance on how to identify risks and 
impacts, and how to avoid and mitigate these as well as how to carry out business 
sustainably.131 With each standard comes an additional Guidance Note with more 
extensive explanations.  
Performance Standard 1 is concerned with an environmental and social risk assessment.  
It states the importance of an assessment of the environmental and social risks and 
opportunities of the project. It also elaborates on how effective community engagement 
should be conducted through informing them about the project. Besides, it establishes 
how a company should manage the environmental and social performance through the 
life-cycle of the project.132 
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The ESIA will in principle have to be carried out before the contract is signed and 
implemented so that the contract negotiations can then be adapted based on the outcomes 
of the ESIA. The ESIA should lead to the investor creating an environmental management 
plan and social action plan, which the State will have to approve.133 The action plan should 
include issues such as recognition of the rights of land owners and rights of Indigenous or 
Tribal Populations. It should avoid and minimize displacement of persons or involuntary 
resettlement. Furthermore, it should include provisions to prevent and minimize the 
potential adverse impact of the project on other potentially affected people. In case 
resettlement is necessary, the investor needs to develop a resettlement plan in 
accordance with IFC Performance Standard 5.  
Performance Standard 5 is concerned with land acquisition and involuntary resettlement. 
Resettlement can have disastrous impacts on livelihoods if not properly managed and 
often relates to the abuse of many human rights. This standard establishes a 
comprehensive resettlement plan.134 In principle, forced evictions will have to be 
prevented, but when they are unavoidable, livelihoods need to be fully restored or 
improved.135  
Finally, annual reporting of the implementation of the action plans is required. The ESIA 
and the action plan always need to be publicly available.136 
Feasibility Studies 
A feasibility study could also be part of due diligence. It identifies the viability of the 
project. This is important, because many agricultural investments fail, often because 
investors were unprofitable.137 An important aspect of the feasibility study is the 
identification of the land for investment. Before entering negotiations, it needs to be clear 
if the land is suitable for the intended investment project, as well as the availability of the 
land.138 When the wrong crop is planted on unsuitable soil, the investment is only meant 
to fail.139 Another aspect that needs to be assessed is what kind of impact a change in land 
use will have on local food security. Both the cultivation of a certain crop and restricting 
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access to land that was used by pastoralists may have implications. When the impact on 
local food security seems too big, the parties should consider not to continue the 
project.140  
Due diligence seems thus extremely important to secure the existing rights to property 
and food security. It is meaningless if humans are negatively affected while a project does 
not have any potential to become successful in any way. 
Identification of Land Tenure Systems 
When it comes to what a due diligence would have to investigate, an important aspect 
with agricultural investments is the identification of the particular land tenure system of 
the country where the investment takes place, as well as other rights of local landowners. 
This has to be the starting point for determining the terms and conditions of the 
contract.141  
However, the identification of land tenure systems is often a difficult task as in many 
African countries no clear system exists. A key aspect of the problematics concerning land 
rights is the fact that most land in developing countries is formally owned by the state, 
while at the same time indigenous peoples and other communities may have customary 
tenure systems that give them legitimate tenure rights to their ancestral lands.142  
A result that is often seen is that the investor is given secure rights to the land, while the 
local people have been expropriated or have lost access to their land.143 These forced 
evictions relate to the most severe adverse impacts of agricultural investment, as many 
related human rights can be infringed. Proper identification of who has rights to what land 
is thus of significant importance to be able to prevent human rights abuses and should 
highly influence the content of the contract.    
For this part of the preparatory phase, the IISD guide refers explicitly to the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of land, fisheries, and forests in the 
context of national food security (VGGT).144 This document was created by the Committee 
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on World Food Security in 2012. It addresses how States and companies can improve the 
governance of tenure of land and is useful to follow when parties want to avoid negative 
impacts that have to do with land disputes, which relate to essential human rights, such 
as the right to food.  
The VGGT assigns a significant part of the responsibility to the State. In its general 
principles, it mentions that “the State should recognize and respect all legitimate tenure 
right holders and their rights. They should take reasonable measures to identify, record 
and respect legitimate tenure right holders and their rights.”145 An important part of the 
guideline is the requirement that the State has to provide legal recognition for legitimate 
tenure rights that are not currently protected by law.146 Subsequently, it requires that the 
State has to safeguard these legitimate tenure rights against threats and infringements.147 
To prevent problems when land is transacted, the guide requires that the State should 
define the categories of rights that it considers to be legitimate. These have to be widely 
publicized. All forms of tenure that it recognizes should give the persons a degree of 
tenure security, which protects them against forced evictions. The state then has to 
protect these rights and make sure that they are not extinguished or infringed.148  
The VGGT also provides guidance on the transfer or reallocation of land. It states that 
when the government transfers the land, is has to take into account what the consequence 
of this will imply for food security. It thus recommends that any investment is carried out 
in a way that contributes to responsible investment.149 Moreover, States have to ensure 
that all actions that they take with regard to tenure are compliant with their existing 
obligations under national and international law, as well as the voluntary commitments 
they have made.150 To protect land tenure rights and other potentially affected human 
rights adequately, it will have to identify risks before any transaction is made. This should 
be done through due consultations with the affected communities, where existing 
legitimate tenure rights have to be identified.151 Additionally, it requires the entire 
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process of land transactions to be transparent. Affected people should be provided with 
comprehensive information.  
The role of business enterprises is to respect national law as well as human rights and 
legitimate tenure rights.152 They are required to carry out due diligence to avoid 
infringements on human rights and legitimate tenure rights of others.153  
Community Engagement 
Moreover, an important aspect of due diligence is the consultation of the local community 
before the start of the negotiations. In the first place, it needs to be assessed which 
communities can potentially be affected. They need to be consulted to identify their 
interests, which can then be taken into account in negotiations. Consultation of the 
community as part of a community engagement plan is also required by the Principles for 
responsible contracts.154 It also refers to the principle of free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC), on which soft law is also available.155 This principle relates to an international 
human rights standard for indigenous people to self-determination as well as to their 
lands, territories and other properties. According to the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People (UNDRIP), States have a duty to obtain the FPIC before any activity that 
affects them can be conducted.156 
After community engagement in the pre-negotiation stage, an effective community 
engagement plan through the life-cycle of the project is required to be set up. The contract 
should state clear responsibility and accountability for the engagement plan.157 It has 
been recognized that acceptance of the terms of the deal by the local community is crucial 
for the long-term success of the project. Through this mechanism, communities may feel 
that their interests are taken seriously.158 
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3.2.4 Contract negotiation stage - general recommendations 
What should now be clear, is that both guides require that the parties have identified the 
potential benefits, risks, and impacts of the investment project. Based on the findings, it 
requires that it takes into account these risks when drafting the terms. What is important 
at this contracting stage is that the parties divide the responsibility and accountability for 
the mitigation of the impacts, as well as who will stand for the costs.159 These will then 
become binding obligations on the contracting parties.  
The second part of the IISD document is constructed like an investment contract and 
advises what should be laid down during the contract negotiation stage. The contents 
page of this model contract provides a comprehensive checklist for negotiators of the 
different issues that may arise with an agricultural investment, and that they are 
encouraged to include in their contracts.160  
The table of contents provides that an agricultural investment contract includes: legal 
definitions, tenure and ownership (duration, geographical boundaries, grant of rights to 
the investor), feasibility study and impact assessments, financial issues (rent and taxes), 
economic and social development obligations (employment), environmental obligations, 
stabilization provisions, grievance mechanisms and dispute settlement, disclosure, 
periodic review, assignment, termination of the contract and monitoring and 
enforcement.161 Below, the issues that are not already described above will shortly be 
elaborated. 
Stabilization Clauses   
The guides recommend the parties to overthink the drafting of stabilization clauses 
carefully. The Principles for Responsible Contracts recognize the investor’s legitimate 
wish to protect itself against arbitrary, discriminatory action by the State, but mentions 
at the same time that ‘freezing clauses’162 are not considered to be a reasonable way of 
doing this. They recommend that stabilization clauses, if they are used, have to be drafted 
very carefully, so that the protections for the investor do not hinder the State’s bona fide 
efforts to implement policies and laws on human rights, to fulfill its duties under 
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international law.163 This recommendation is thus important for the development of 
human rights protection in general.  
Project Monitoring and Compliance  
The contract should delineate responsibility for compliance with the standards to protect 
human rights that apply to the contract. To ensure enforcement of this compliance, the 
contract should establish the State’s right to monitor this compliance, while the investor 
has to adhere to the standards.164 This right of the State is in line with their obligation to 
protect human rights and to ensure respect for their laws. When the State lacks the 
capacity to do this adequately, it should enable itself with external expertise.165  
Transparency/Disclosure of Contract Terms  
According to both guides, the contract terms have to be disclosed.166 When this is not the 
case, this should be based on compelling justifications, and the contract should state 
clearly the scope and duration of this exception.167 It is recommended that the State 
standardizes its practice for disclosing contracts with all investors. In this way, investors 
may be more willing to accept disclosure if it affects their competitors in the same way.168  
Transparency is significant and considered essential for the responsible management of 
natural resources, that goes together with the potential for growth and economic 
development that these resources can provide.169 When contracts are disclosed, 
government officials cannot seek their own interests over the population’s but may be 
watched and pressured to negotiate a good deal.170 It could also be effective against 
corruption.171  
Furthermore, it may take away suspicion by other stakeholders of what is in the contract 
and may promote trust. It could even be considered that citizens have a right to know how 
their government is selling their resources.172 The fact that the contract can be seen as a 
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public policy document would legitimate public disclosure. Contracts may indeed contain 
clauses that directly affect citizens when the contract delineates how they will be 
protected against any risks that may arise, or when the contract contains sections on land 
use and rights, as well as resettlement provisions.173 
Moreover, disclosure of contract terms enables the parties to communicate transparently 
with the affected communities, and should even be viewed as part of the community 
engagement plan.174 The condition for meaningful transparency requires though that the 
information is accessible.175 
The EITI Standard176 is one of the soft law initiatives that suggests reforms to strengthen 
transparency and accountability in the extractive industry sector. It has been created by 
governments, companies and civil society organizations.177 The EITI Principles178 have 
also been used for agricultural investments as they may both be concerned with the lease 
of land, natural resources, development objectives and risks for human rights.  
Besides, institutes such as GRAIN (farmlandgrab.org) contribute to transparency and 
public scrutiny through publishing State-investor contracts on their blog. Another 
initiative is openlandcontracts.org, by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.  
3.2.5 Contract negotiation stage and the integration of soft law principles  
Physical Security for the Project  
Another recommendation on which the Principles state that the contract should delineate 
clear responsibility is the physical security for the project’s facilities, installations or 
personal. This has to be provided in a way consistent with human rights principles and 
standards. This is recommended because some of the most severe human rights abuses 
related to business have involved security personnel. The contract should include a 
protocol to manage the security forces to prevent and mitigate human rights abuses.179  
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It is crucial that security services are taken into account in the contract, as any violence 
committed by these, could lead to the investor being complicit in a human rights abuse 
because they have hired these forces. The Principles therefore also recommend that 
operational-level grievance mechanisms and remedies should be available for anyone 
who claims to have suffered from negative human rights impacts.180 They also refer to 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and The Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials.181  
Grievance Mechanisms for Non-Contractual Harms to Third Parties   
Despite best efforts, not all adverse impacts can always be prevented, but one of the top 5 
adverse impacts of investments identified by the World Bank relates to the insufficient 
mechanisms to raise grievances on the impacts.182 Both guides for negotiators therefore 
require that an (operational-level) grievance mechanism is set up.183  
The Principles for responsible investment refer directly to the GPs, where grievance 
mechanisms have been developed for individuals and communities who have been 
adversely impacted by the investor. The GPs distinguish State-based grievance 
mechanisms (both judicial and non-judicial) from non-State-based grievance 
mechanisms. This last category may be administered by the business enterprise and is 
often in the form of an operational-level grievance mechanism.184  
This type of access to remedy has some significant advantages. The first advantage is that 
it is, in fact, part of the on-going due diligence, as affected people can raise their concerns 
directly when they believe that they will be or are adversely affected (the risk in itself is 
thus enough to make a complaint). Patterns in complaints can in that way easily be 
tracked. The second advantage is that the impacts can be remediated at a relatively early 
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stage and directly by the enterprise before harms will have the chance to escalate.185 Extra 
benefits are thus speed to access, but also reduced costs.  
However, to ensure the effectiveness of the operational-level grievance mechanisms, it 
should reflect the following criteria. The mechanism should be: legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, a source of continuous learning 
and based on engagement and dialogue.186 Remedies can include apologies, restitution, 
rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation, punitive sanctions, and 
guarantees of non-repetition.187 
Besides the GPs, the IISD guide refers directly to IFC Performance Standards 1,2 and 5,188 
that also contain guidelines for how to set up a grievance mechanism.189 Including the 
establishment of a grievance mechanism in the contract makes it a binding obligation for 
the company to have this in place. It is required that the contract states clearly who is 
responsible for the establishment of an operational grievance mechanism.190 
3.2.6 Concluding remarks  
Soft law can contribute to human rights protection because it proposes how companies 
can ensure that human rights are protected and respected. Agriculture-specific soft law 
reminds the companies of what issues they need to think of during agricultural 
investments and propose guidelines that can be followed to fulfill the corporate duty to 
respect.  
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4. Consequences of the contractualization of soft law on human rights 
Where the previous chapter discussed how soft law and contract are combined in policy 
initiatives in the form of guides for negotiators, this chapter will discuss the effect of this 
combination for human rights protection.  
4.1 Opportunities to the contractualization of human rights norms 
When the recommendations of the guides for negotiators would be followed, then the 
contract could (for example) state that before the project may commence, an ESIA will 
have to be conducted and a management and action plan will have to be set up, all in 
accordance with IFC Performance Standard 1. As this required conduct is now included in 
the contract, it has become a legally binding obligation between the parties. This means 
that a principle from soft law on human rights has become ‘contractualized’. 
The soft law documents or mechanisms that are referred to are then no longer voluntary 
to implement. A failure to perform the obligation will amount to a breach of contract. As 
the soft law initiates better respect and protection for human rights, this would 
presumably lead to better conditions for human rights in practice. Moreover, the 
contractualization makes the soft law stronger and more effective. This is especially 
where a direct reference is made to a certain soft law document, which means that the 
parties have to comply with the particular conduct described in that document. This is 
also the value of soft law in the specific context of contracts. 
However, to ensure that particular conduct in favor of human rights is performed, it is 
important that the contract establishes who is responsible for performing what particular 
soft law mechanism that they have agreed on to apply. Only then, they can hold one 
another accountable for not performing the commitments.  
The inclusion of clauses that are designed to prevent and mitigate human rights risks 
accords to many of the Guiding Principles. These require the State to protect human 
rights, and the business enterprise to respect. Moreover, GPs 5 and 6 state explicitly that 
the State has to exercise adequate oversight to meet their obligation to protect human 
rights when they contract with business enterprises and that they should promote respect 
for human rights by business enterprises with which they conduct commercial 
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transactions.191 Including the GPs in the contract would thus push forward the respect for 
human rights, which would be a welcome development.  
Besides a reflection of GPs in the contracts, an effort to achieve an even greater 
accommodation of human rights in the contracts can recently be identified. This relates 
to commitments in the contracts that rise above the ‘respect’ pillar of the GPs.192 Examples 
are employment creation or a promise to build infrastructure.  
Furthermore, the contractualization of human rights can also accomplish that a higher 
standard of human rights protection will be applicable on a certain investment project in 
a country where domestic law is not yet as far developed. In this situation, the 
contractualization of human rights can probably also have an impact on the deployment 
of human rights standards in host countries.193 
4.2 Challenges to the contractualization of human rights norms  
Notwithstanding these benefits, there are still a few issues that might stand in the way to 
make the commitments fully effective in practice, and which would thus partly hinder the 
enhancement of protection for human rights through the contractualization of human 
rights norms and soft law in State-investor contracts.  
The first challenge relates to the applicability of the contractual clauses on third parties. 
In principle, the contract does only create rights and obligations between the parties of 
the contract, which means that only they can hold each other accountable. Third-party 
beneficiaries, which may often be affected people and communities, may have a hard time 
to make those contractualized human rights meaningful and effective, despite the fact that 
these benefits have been created for them.194  
To overcome this impotence, third parties should be given the opportunity to hold the 
investor accountable for its obligations in the contract. This could be solved by including 
in the contract that third-party beneficiaries can enforce terms of the contract. However, 
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it is not very likely that an investor will accede to such a mechanism, as he could then be 
held accountable by a lot of unknown claimants.195  
The second challenge relates to the issue whether the contractualization of human rights 
is compatible with the classical features of contract law. Especially the due diligence 
mechanism as proposed in the GPs poses a challenge, as it is described as “ongoing, 
recognizing that the human rights risks may change over time as the business enterprise’s 
operation and operating context evolve.”196 The management of the risks would have to 
be taken into account, but the fact that these may change would affect the contractual 
stability and certainty. However, it would probably be legitimate to let a change of 
contract supersede to respond to developments that affect human rights.197  
Another contractual issue concerns contract law that may be applicable and that would 
tell the consequences when a clause is breached. In many cases, the primary remedy for 
non-performance will be the award of damages in the form of compensation.198 However, 
when it concerns adverse impacts for human rights due to particular conduct, specific 
performance (change of conduct) may be more desirable instead of money.199 Moreover, 
a situation where one party will receive money, and the victims whose human rights have 
been abused receive no remedy at all may create to reputational risks.200  
4.3 Relativization  
The contract that contractualizes soft law on human rights has thus potential to push 
forward respect for human rights through the creation of obligations. However, it needs 
to be acknowledged that the contract remains at the same time merely a contract, which 
stays dependent on the actual implementation of the commitments by the investor, and 
the enforcement by the government, for which there is no guarantee. Enforcement 
remains a long-term challenge, especially in developing countries where capacity may be 
limited. Governments should not underestimate the importance, the time and the costs 
that the monitoring of the implementation commitments takes.201 To materialize the 
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commitments, it is thus essential that the parties follow the recommendations described 
in the guides for negotiators about the monitoring and enforcement of the contract.  
Besides, the situation in practice remains that while it is unlikely that investment on bad 
terms will lead to a sustainable investment that improves the situation for human rights, 
there are still examples of bad contracts that led to quite good investment projects. At the 
same time, there are examples of well-drafted contracts that resulted in investment 
projects with lots of adverse impacts to human rights.202 This means that the contract is 
just one piece of all aspects that will lead to a sustainable investment project.  
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5. Case study  
 
It would be interesting to analyze what the effects of the contractualization of human 
rights have meant for human rights protection in practice. However, this is not an easy 
task as it requires both a contract that is publicly available and that contains references 
to soft law and mechanisms, and subsequently information on the current situation on the 
ground due to the investment project, for which this thesis is dependent on reports of 
others. Case study opportunities that discuss this are therefore limited in this research. 
Moreover, no information is findable online on how many projects have followed the 
recommendations in the guides for negotiators. Information on how they have 
experienced this and if this has led to better protection would be welcome. 
When looking for contracts at webpages as farmlandgrab.org, openlandcontracts.org and 
searching engines, it became clear that at least in the contracts that were publicly 
available and that concern agricultural investments, references to soft law were scarce. 
The almost only mechanism that appeared now and then and that could be beneficial to 
human rights were protections of the environment through the requirement of an EIA. 
The following case study will discuss an EIA requirement. 
5.1 The Golden Veroleum Company in Liberia 
5.1.1 Liberian State-investor contracts 
Liberia is an interesting country to analyze because Liberian State-investor contracts are 
referred to as examples of good practice.203 The efforts to create responsible, sustainable 
investment contracts are part of a bigger development by the Liberian government to 
renegotiate investment projects at the time, by a strong government negotiating team 
with the assistance of the International Senior Lawyers Project,204 a pro bono initiative 
that supports low-income country governments with legal expertise for large-scale 
development issues.205 Liberia has also implemented the EITI transparency 
requirements. All their State-investor contracts for extractive industries, but also some 
agricultural ones are available online.206 Additionally, all Liberian State-investor contracts 
have to be ratified by parliament. This gives every member of parliament the ability to 
                                                          
203 Cotula 2011, p. 2.  
204 <http://islp.org/our-story/#what-we-do>, retrieved 10-07-2017.  
205 Cotula 2011, p. 44.  
206 <www.leiti.org.lr>.  
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assess whether a particular deal has the potential to be beneficial to the country and its 
people.   
5.1.2 The agreement with the Golden Veroleum Company 
A closer look will be taken at the 2010 Concession agreement between the Liberian 
government and Golden Veroleum (GVL).207 GVL is backed by Golden Agri-Resources, 
which is the world’s second biggest palm oil producer. It needs to be kept in mind that 
this contract was concluded before the publications of the GPs and most of the other soft 
law.  
The contract seems very comprehensive, with about 126 pages including annexes, and is 
very detailed. An annex with the exact land that is concerned is provided. The contract 
does contain a clear grant of rights, although it states that the concession area shall be 
“free and clear of all encumbrances,”208 despite the fact that the Liberian government has 
the obligation to respect the customary land rights of citizens.209 It also contains 
provisions on resettlement, which are allowed to take place if “the existing settlement and 
its inhabitants would impede Investor’s development of the concession area and would 
interfere with Investors activities.”210 Sole responsibility for the resettlement lays with 
the State. Besides, it contains clauses about employment. It makes direct reference that 
GVL will refrain from hiring minors, and respect the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.211 Priority for employment of Liberian nationals for unskilled labor 
positions must be given.212  
While this contract covers some of the aspects that are nowadays required in a contract 
according to the IISD guide, many issues are also lacking, for example feasibility studies 
and social impact assessment requirements and no grievance mechanism can be found. 
Although this contract seems to have been written with care, it seems quite much in favor 
of the investor who is accommodated by the government, no matter if human rights will 
                                                          
207 Concession Agreement between the Republic of Liberia and Golden Veroleum (Liberia) Inc. 16 August 
2010, available at: <https://www.scribd.com/document/152067402/An-Act-to-Ratify-The-Concession-
Agreement-Between-The-Republic-of-Liberia-and-Golden-Veroleum-Liberia-Inc-September-1-2010>, 
retrieved 30-07-2017.  
208 Concession Agreement 2010, Article 5.1.  
209 Global Witness, ‘The New Snake Oil? The Violence, Threats and False Promises Driving Rapid Palm Oil 
Expansion in Liberia’, July 2015, p. 14.  
210 Concession Agreement 2010, Article 4.3 a.  
211 Concession Agreement 2010, Article 12.1 a.  
212 Concession Agreement 2010, Article 12.a.  
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be affected. The government will remain responsible for some significant possible 
adverse impacts.213 
5.1.3 Reference to soft law 
References to soft law can be found when it comes to environmental protection: GVL will 
have to prepare an EIA Study Report and an Environmental Management Plan that will 
have to be approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) beforehand.214 GVL 
will also have to comply with the Principles of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO), to which it is a member. The RSPO Principles also require an EIA.215 In addition, 
the RSPO refers to other soft law (mechanisms) which GVL will have to comply to.  
5.1.4 Role of the contract  
The development of domestic Liberian law for the agricultural sector is far behind, which 
makes that agricultural investments take place in a legal vacuum.216 As of 2016, there 
were no laws that are specifically created for the concessions that relate to agricultural 
investments, and to what kind of safeguards for human rights these concessions should 
be subject.217 This means that the role of the contract increases, as it will have to regulate 
aspects that are not regulated by domestic law.  
5.1.5 The situation in practice  
A recent report by Global Witness218 shows that affected communities pay a high price of 
the oil palm investments, and find their land rights abused. The 2010 contract between 
the government and GVL is valid for 98 years and converts 2,600 km2 of land into palm 
oil plantations. However, 41,000 people lived on this land and relied on the land for their 
food and livelihoods.219 The report carried out on Liberia shows that it is actually on the 
                                                          
213 The government remains responsible for the setting up of a resettlement action plan, and stands in 
principle for the costs (Concession Agreement 2010, Article 4.3.a). The same goes for Community 
Programs. While the parties agree that production shall make sure that the communities around the area 
will be assured continuing economic and social viability, the government is responsible for any additional 
plans and programs (Concession Agreement 2010, Article 15.1).  
214 Concession Agreement 2010, Article 16.  
215 Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, Principles and Criteria for the Production of Sustainable Palm Oil, 
25 April 2013, Principle 5, p. 24. These criteria are a revision of the 2008 principles. The RSPO is an 
association that promotes the production of sustainable palm oil.  
216 Global Witness 2015, p. 12.  
217 Global Witness 2015, p. 12.  
218 Global Witness is an NGO that aims to stop environmental and human rights abuses related to the 
exploitation of natural resources. Source: <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/about-us/>, retrieved 2-8-
2017. Report: Global Witness 2015.  
219 Global Witness 2015, p. 5-6.  
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edge of a land grabbing crisis.220 Especially GVL has been connected to adverse impacts 
due to agricultural expansion.  
The main problem in Liberia is that the government is convinced that the expansion of 
palm oil plantations is a key to development and that it will bring jobs, food, and 
infrastructure to their country.221 To ensure the continuation of GVLs operations in 
Liberia, and to grant expansions of the plantations, the government has created a climate 
of fear and intimidation. The government and the company do seek prior ‘consultations’ 
and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) by making the locals sign a ‘Memoranda of 
Understanding’ where they give away their land. However, Global Witness is concerned 
whether the people have enough information to know what they are signing. Also, they 
are subject to government officials who watch them sign, so that they have no choice but 
to give their consent. The benefits, on the other hand, were negligible.222  
The government gives thus priority to the palm oil industry instead of protecting human 
rights, and violence has been used to those who protested against the expansion of GVLs 
plantation areas. These people are considered as ‘anti-development’.223 The following 
quote from the former president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, in the Liberian press illustrates 
this: “You are trying to undermine your own government. You can’t do that. If you do so 
all the foreign investors coming to Liberia will close their business and leave, then 
Liberian [sic] will go back to the old days.”224 
5.1.6 Effects of the contractualization of human rights  
The contract contains thus reference to the soft law mechanism of EIAs, which relates to 
a contractualization of duties that are beneficial to human rights. It is unclear whether the 
GVL has fulfilled its duty to report to the EPA, but GVL pledges to meet the voluntary 
environmental and social standards created by the RSPO that requires respect for 
customary property rights and ensure that plantations can only be accessed through the 
FPIC procedure. However, the affected communities do not find the RSPO to be an 
                                                          
220 Global Witness 2015, p. 5.   
221 Global Witness 2015, p. 5.  
222 Global Witness 2015, p. 6.  
223 Global Witness 2015, p. 6.  
224 ‘Ellen Ends Deadlock in Grand Cape Mount County… Maintains Sime Darby Must Be Allowed To 
Operate’, The Inquirer, <http://www.theinquirer.com.lr/content1.php?main=news&news_id=156>, 
retrieved 2-8-2017.  
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effective way of protecting their rights.225 This may be influenced by the fact that the 
affected communities had raised complaints to the RSPO, of which most were rejected. 
Also Liberian NGOs stated that the RSPO Complaints Panel fell short of a sufficient 
response.226 
The fact that the affected communities do not consider the RSPO to be an effective way of 
protecting their rights, implies that the particular mechanism or particular soft law 
document which is integrated into the contract matters a great deal. If the particular soft 
law document included does not contain any meaningful conditions for human rights 
protection (or when it is not considered to be effective), the contractualization of human 
rights will not lead to an improvement of protection for human rights. The combination 
of soft law and contract will not be effective.  
This case study shows as well that compliance will always remain important. How well-
drafted the contract may be, and to whatever voluntary standards a company may have 
committed itself, adequate protection will only be ensured when they are performed. Also 
the effectiveness of the contractualization of human rights remains dependent on 
adequate enforcement, but therefore third parties usually remain dependent on the State. 
Conflicts of interest between accommodating the investor and fulfilling their duty to 
respect are realistic. They might possibly stand in way to enforce the contract adequately. 
5.1.7 Concluding remarks 
What can be concluded is that there is space for improvement for what regards Liberian 
agricultural State-investor contracts. This case study shows that a relatively well-drafted 
contract does not plainly lead to a good outcome. As people find their rights abused, 
because the contract terms put human rights at risk, the State has failed in its obligation 
to protect human rights. GVL has neither fulfilled its duty to respect human rights.227 Also, 
it suggests that the particular soft law that is referred to matters for the protection that 
can be achieved through contractualization of human rights.  
                                                          
225 Global Witness 2015, p. 12.  
226 Global Witness 2015, p. 13.  
227 T. Lomax, ‘Human Rights-Based Analysis of the Agricultural Concession Agreements Between Sime 
Darby and Golden Veroleum and the Government of Liberia’, Forest Peoples Programme, December 2012, 
p. 32.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has investigated the extent to which the combination of soft law and State-
investor contracts could provide better protection for the human rights risks that come 
with large-scale agricultural investments. This is relevant because land grabs still happen 
frequently, and because the contract can influence the impact on human rights. The 
combination of soft law and contract can be found in policy initiatives in the form of guides 
for negotiators, which try to improve State-investor contracts.  
Two sub-questions were relevant to investigate the central issue. Regarding the first 
question, that related to the role that the contract could play for human rights protection, 
it can be concluded that the contract will become more important in case domestic law is 
not fully developed, especially for what regards human rights protection. The contract can 
then fill this gap, and in some cases even apply higher standards for human rights 
protection. As the contract terms directly influence the outcome, the contract could be of 
influence on human rights protection.  
The second sub-question related to the value of soft law in the specific context of State-
investor contracts. Soft law and soft law mechanisms are valuable because they provide 
useful guidance on how human rights can be protected and mitigated. The Guiding 
Principles have clarified that business enterprises are under a duty to respect human 
rights. A shortcoming of soft law lays in its voluntary basis, but the value of soft law in the 
specific context of contracts becomes clear when the parties integrate soft law in their 
contracts. They can do this by stating that it is applicable or that certain practice has to be 
conducted in accordance with a particular soft law standard.  
In fact, soft law has then become ‘contractualized’. It is important that the contract 
establishes who is responsible for the performance. The commitment to comply with the 
particular soft law standard has become a binding obligation between the parties. Non-
performance will therefore lead to a breach of contract. Soft law will thus become more 
effective, and the binding nature would presumably result in better human rights 
protection. The only aspect is that the parties will need to include soft law in the contract. 
This relates to the duty of the State under international law to protect human rights 
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actively, also when they contract with business enterprises.228 The contractualization can 
in this way push forward respect for human rights.  
While the binding nature of commitments on human rights protection poses favorable 
conditions in theory, improved protection for human rights through contractualization 
remains theoretically still dependent on the performance of the commitments in practice. 
Also, third parties are in most cases not able to rely directly on the terms of the contract. 
Subsequently, effective protection remains dependent on the monitoring and 
enforcement of the contract by the State. Due to the frequent incapacity of developing 
countries to monitor and enforce adequately, and sometimes due to conflicts of interest, 
contracts are not always effectively enforced.    
To answer the central question: the combination of soft law and contracts can provide 
better protection for human rights to the extent to which the commitments in the contract 
are actually performed and effectively enforced in practice. Because performance and 
enforcement are often deficient, the contractualization of human rights will only be 
effective to a limited extent. When State capacity to effectively monitor and enforce would 
be increased, maybe through the assistance of developing agencies, better protection for 
human rights due to this strategy may be within reach. 
 
 
  
                                                          
228 Guiding Principles A/HRC/17/31 2011, Principles 5 and 6, p. 10.  
52 
 
Bibliography 
Hard law and soft law instruments  
 
Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 
2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups. 
 
Equator Principles, The Equator Principles June 2013. 
 
FAO, ‘Respecting Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Practical Guidance for Governments, 
Companies, NGOs, Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in Relation to Land 
Acquisition’, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome 2014. 
 
FAO, ‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security’. Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations Rome 2012.  
 
IFC, IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, January 
2012. 
 
OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, OECD Publishing 2011.  
United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paris 10 
December 1948. 
United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966. 
 
United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966. 
 
United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, A/RES/61/295, 2007. 
 
United Nations Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights, A/HRC/8/5, 2008. 
United Nations Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
A/HRC/17/31, 2011.  
United Nations Human Rights Council, Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating 
the Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: 
Guidance for Negotiators, Addendum 3 to the Report, A/HRC/17/31/Add.3, 2011.  
53 
 
Agreements 
Land Lease Contract between Republique du Cameroun and La Société Sucriere du 
Cameroun (Sosucam) of 20 April 2006, article 3. Available at: 
<https://www.farmlandgrab.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Cameroon-
contract.pdf>, retrieved 17-08-2017. 
Concession Agreement between the Republic of Liberia and ADA Commercial Inc, of 11 
June 2008, available at: <https://www.scribd.com/document/152412349/An-Act-
Ratifying-the-Concession-Agreement-between-the-Republic-of-Liberia-and-ADA-
Commercial-Inc>, retrieved 17-8-2017. 
Investment agreement between the Republic of Mali and La Grande Jamahiriya arabe 
Libyenne populaire et socialiste of 2008, available at: 
<https://www.farmlandgrab.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Convention.pdf>, 
retrieved 17-8-2017.  
‘Contract for the Exclusive Utilisation of Land’ between AgroAfrica AS (AA) and La 
Communaute Rurale de Kounkane (CRK) of 7 March 2008, available at: 
<https://www.farmlandgrab.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Agroafrica-contrat-
senegal-.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017. 
Concession Agreement between the Republic of Liberia and Golden Veroleum (Liberia) 
Inc. 16 August 2010, available at: <https://www.scribd.com/document/152067402/An-
Act-to-Ratify-The-Concession-Agreement-Between-The-Republic-of-Liberia-and-
Golden-Veroleum-Liberia-Inc-September-1-2010>, retrieved 30-07-2017. 
Articles 
A. Crockett, ‘Human Rights Clauses in Commercial Contracts’, 4 June 2014, available at: 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-rights/portfolio-items/6667/>, 
retrieved 12-8-2017. 
Y. Farah, ‘Improving accountability through the contractualisation of human rights’, The 
Business and Human Rights Review 2013, Issue 2.  
J. Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?’, 28 January 2014, available at: 
<https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTreaty.pdf> 
retrieved 31-07-2017.  
M. Taylor, L. Zandvliet & M. Forouhar, ‘Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk-Based 
Approach’, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 53. Cambridge, 
MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.  
D. Vhugen, Large-Scale Commercial Investments in Land: Seeking to Secure Land Tenure 
and Improve Livelihoods, Haramaya Law Review 2012, Volume 1 No. 1.  
54 
 
Books 
L. Cotula & K. Tienhaara, ‘Reconfiguring Investment Contracts to Promote Sustainable 
Development’, in: K. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 
2011-2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013. 
R. Dolzer and C. Schreuder, Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2012.  
O. de Schutter, J. Swinnen & J. Wouters (eds), Foreign direct investment and human 
development - the Law and Economics of International Investment Agreements, New York: 
Routledge 2013. 
Reports  
C. Althoff et al., ‘“Land grabs” operationalized?’, presentation to the Annual World Bank 
Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington DC, 14-18 March 2016, available at: 
<https://www.conftool. com/landandpoverty2016/index.php/Althoff-674-674_paper. 
pdf?page=downloadPaper&filename=Althoff-674-674_paper. 
pdf&form_id=674&form_version=final> retrieved 9-8-2017. 
L. Cotula, ‘Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and 
international land deals in Africa’, IIED/FAO/IFAD, London/Rome 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.fao.org/3/a-ak241e.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
L. Cotula, ‘Land deals in Africa: What is in the contracts?’, IIED, London 2011. Available 
at: <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12568IIED.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
K. Deiniger & D. Byerlee, ‘Rising Global Interest in Farmland – Can it Yield Sustainable 
and Equitable Benefits?’, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2011. Available at:  
<https://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Rising-Global-Interest-in-
Farmland.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.   
Global Witness, ‘The New Snake Oil? The Violence, Threats and False Promises Driving 
Rapid Palm Oil Expansion in Liberia’, July 2015, available at: 
<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/new-snake-oil/>, retrieved 
31-07-2017.  
GRI, ‘Land Tenure Rights: The need for greater transparency among companies 
worldwide’, GRI 2016. <https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-G4-
Land-Tenure-Rights.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
International Land Coalition, ‘Tirana Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor in 
Times of Intensified Natural Resources Competition’, International Land Coalition 2011, 
available at: 
<http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/tiranadeclara
tion.pdf>, retrieved 13-8-2017.  
55 
 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Foreign Direct Investment Trends and Statistics’, IMF 
2003. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fdi/eng/2003/102803.pdf>, 
retrieved 17-8-2017. 
T. Lomax, ‘Human Rights-Based Analysis of the Agricultural Concession Agreements 
Between Sime Darby and Golden Veroleum and the Government of Liberia’, Forest 
Peoples Programme, December 2012. Available at: 
<http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2012/12/liberiacontractan
alysisfinaldec2012_0.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
MMDA 1.0 Model Mine Development Agreement. International Bar Association 2011. 
 
S. Marshall, ‘OECD National Contact Points: Better Navigating Conflict to Provide 
Remedy for Vulnerable Communities’, Non-Judicial Redress Mechanisms Report Series 16, 
2016, p. 6. Available at: 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57e140116a4963b5a1ad9780/t/580d7b7bb3
db2b51a441a6e8/1477278601503/NJM16_OECD.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
OECD, ‘Frequently Asked Questions – National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises’, OECD 2017. Available at: 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Guidelines-for-MNEs-NCP-FAQ.pdf>, retrieved 
13-8-2017. 
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect Human Rights – An Interpretative Guide, UN HR/PUB/12/02, United Nations: 
New York and Geneva 2012 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-
2017.  
Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions about the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, United Nations HR/PUB/13/3, New 
York and Geneva 2014 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQ_PrinciplesBussinessHR.pdf>, 
retrieved 17-8-2017.  
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘A Turn to Responsible 
Contracting: Harnessing Human Rights to Transform Investment.’ E15Initiative. Geneva: 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World 
Economic Forum 2015. Available at: http://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Investment-OHCHR-Final.pdf, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
P. Rosenblum & S. Maples, ‘Contracts Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive 
Industries’ Revenue Watch Institute 2009. 
<https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI-Contracts-Confidential.pdf>, 
retrieved 17-8-2017.  
56 
 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, ‘Principles and Criteria for the Production of 
Sustainable Palm Oil’, 25 April 2013, available at: <http://www.rspo.org/key-
documents/certification/rspo-principles-and-criteria>, retrieved 3-8-2017. 
O. de Schutter, ‘Tainted Lands: Corruption in Large-Scale Land Deals’, International 
Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) & Global Witness, 2016. Available at: < 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/tainted-lands-corruption-
large-scale-land-deals/>, retrieved 31-07-2017. 
A. Shemberg, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights – a research project conducted for 
the IFC and the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General on Business and 
Human Rights, United Nations, 2009, available at: 
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/9feb5b00488555eab8c4fa6a6515bb18/Stabil
ization%2BPaper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
C. Smaller, ‘The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland and 
Water’, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2014. 
<https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-guide-negotiating-
investment-contracts-farmland-water_1.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
C. Smaller & W. Speller, with H. Mirza, N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, and G. Dixie, 
‘Investment Contracts for Agriculture: Maximizing Gains and Minimizing Risks’, 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group; New York: United Nations; and Winnipeg: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2015. 
<https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/world-bank-agri-investment-
contracts-web.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-2017.  
World Bank, ‘The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger-Scale 
Agricultural Investments – Implications for Corporate Performance and Impact on Local 
Communities’, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2014. 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wb_unctad_2014_en.pdf>, retrieved 17-8-
2017.  
Online resources 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx>, retrieved 14-04-
2017. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-rights/connections/regulating-
investment/state-investor-contracts/>, retrieved 26-06-2017. 
<http://islp.org/our-story/#what-we-do>, retrieved 10-07-2017.   
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/93-seized-the-2008-landgrab-for-food-and-
financial-security>, retrieved 31-07-2017.  
‘Ellen Ends Deadlock in Grand Cape Mount County… Maintains Sime Darby Must Be 
Allowed To Operate’, The Inquirer, 
57 
 
<http://www.theinquirer.com.lr/content1.php?main=news&news_id=156>, retrieved 
2-8-2017.  
<https://www.globalwitness.org/en/about-us/>, retrieved 2-8-2017.  
<http://landmatrix.org/en/about/#where-does-the-information-come-from>, retrieved 
9-8-2017. 
<http://landmatrix.org/en/>, retrieved 9-8-2017. 
<http://landmatrix.org/en/get-the-idea/web-transnational-deals/>, retrieved 9-8-
2017. 
<http://landmatrix.org/en/get-the-idea/agricultural-drivers/>, retrieved 9-8-2017. 
<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/whoweare/>, retrieved 11-8-2017. 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Guidelines-for-MNEs-NCP-FAQ.pdf>, retrieved 
13-8-2017. 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-
human-rights-law/>, retrieved 14-8-2017. 
<http://www.openlandcontracts.org/countries>, retrieved 18-8-2017.  
<https://www.farmlandgrab.org/home/post_special?filter=contracts>, retrieved 18-8-
2017.  
